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A new genre of scholarly writing has emerged in recent years in the ﬁeld of what
one can broadly call critical international theory. Its principal deﬁning feature
is an intense preoccupation with the phenomenon of the so-called ‘new world
order’, which it tries to explain and describe through an analytical lens constructed
primarily around two ideas: the idea of ‘empire’ and the idea of ‘imperial law’. In
this article I attempt to provide a brief overview of this genre, which for the sake of
simplicity I shall call henceforth the ‘new imperial law’ or NIL genre, and to reﬂect
critically on its underlying ideological dynamics.1
The basic way in which I propose to go about this task is by taking up a series of
essays collected in a recently published volume,Empire’s Law: TheAmerican Imperial
Project and the ‘War to Remake the World’, and treating them, so to say, as a window
into the rest of the genre. Needless to mention, this is not the only possible way in
which one can conduct this sort of study. The reason I have chosen it over other
alternatives is essentially threefold: ﬁrst, the volume in question brings together
several names who seem to command quite a considerable amount of attention
in critical international theory circles; second, the arguments rehearsed across the
various essays seem to me to be highly representative of all the major NIL themes;
third, setting up the enquiry this way, I believe, makes it easier to achieve that ever-
elusive balance between abstract theorizing and concrete practical illustrations that
the kind of enterprise I want to pursue here traditionally requires.
∗ University of Glasgow [a.rasulov@law.gla.ac.uk]. I thank John Haskell, Robert Knox, Umut O¨zsu, and Rose
Parﬁtt for their invaluable comments and suggestions on various earlier drafts. All views and opinions are
mine alone.
1 Although it has a number of notable parallels in more traditional varieties of liberal international law
scholarship, theNIL genre, quite certainly, constitutes a newdeparture in theﬁeld of international theory. As
I shall show in the pages ahead, theway it frames the general problematic of the contemporaryworld order –
‘empire’ vs. ‘law’, ‘United States’ vs. ‘Europe’, ‘Hobbes’ vs. ‘Rousseau’ – and the implicit ideological vision it
imparts with that are highly original. For themost representative examples of the NIL genre, other than the
volume under review see also M. La Torre, ‘Global Citizenship? Political Rights under Imperial Conditions’,
(2005) 18Ratio Juris 236; J. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law’, (2004) 18 (3) Ethics
& International Affairs 1; N. Bhuta, ‘A Global State of Exception? The United States and World Order’, (2003)
10 Constellations 371; ‘America and theWorld’, infra note 25.
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In the end, it is only the broader generic patterns that I aim to investigate in
these pages, not the immediate substance of any particular piece of writing. What
follows below, in other words, should not be seen simply as a review essay or
critique of any one particular author’s work, butmore as an attempt to investigate a
certain way of thinking about the ‘new imperial order’ – its substantive features, its
narrative tropology, and, ultimately, its ideological meaning in the contemporary
critical-theoretical conjuncture.
1. NIL: THE FIRST IMPRESSION
In terms of their general positioning, all NIL writings are commonly characterized
by two principal features. In the ﬁrst place, they are all invariably presented as
works of critical social theory, that is to say, as works that are designed to demystify,
elucidate, and expose some previously obfuscated aspect of socio-historical reality
so as to reveal the ‘hidden forms of domination and exploitation that shape it’.2 In
the second place, they are simultaneously held out also as profoundly political acts
with an explicitly left-wing counter-hegemonic bias.
Take the aforementioned collection, Empire’s Law. Between the editorial intro-
duction and the glowing endorsements on its back cover, the volume is proclaimed
not simply ‘a “must read” for students of international law, politics and ethics’ but
also ‘required reading [for] citizens theworld over’. As its editorial teamunderstands
it, its primary aspiration is to bring together ‘some of the world’s most outstanding
theorists’ so as ‘to provide a uniquely lucid account’ – not just of how the ‘new
imperial order’ has come about, but also of what sort of power dynamics feed it
and what kinds of implications this has for freedom, democracy, and the rule of
law around the world. The underlying objective behind all this is to ‘recover and
repossess our democratic discourse and politics’ on behalf of ‘international law’,
‘legality and human rights’ and against the ‘new imperial hegemony’ (p. 217).
Now, whatever one may feel about the general merits of such an enterprise, the
one practical problem with it in the present case is that, quite simply, it just does
not work. The more closely one inspects the immediate contents of what actually
tends to get said in the generalNIL discourse, themore obvious it becomes thatmost
NIL writings tend to demonstrate a systematic tendency to pass over not only some
of the most basic elements of the international legal doctrine – in one of his more
notable essays, ‘Interpreting the Fall of a Monument’ (pp. 44–51), Ju¨rgen Habermas,
for example, declares that ‘the core mission of the UN [is to] eliminate the jus ad
bellum’ (p. 44)3 – but also the numerous background practices and sensibilities that
makeup thenuts andbolts of the correspondingdisciplinaryprojects anddiscourses
of international law and international relations.What is more, in many cases these
intellectual slippages are further compounded by such a heavy dose of what could
only be described as crude, undisguised Eurosupremacism that even the otherwise
2 L.Wacquant, ‘Critical Thought as Solvent ofDoxa’, (2004) 11 Constellations 97, at 97.
3 The same line is repeated also in Cohen, supra note 1, at 12. Leaving aside the bizarrely reiﬁcationist vision
of jus this view implies, if the law on the use of forcewas indeed supposed to have been ‘eliminated’ with the
creation of the United Nations, howwould one then understand Articles 2(4), 42, or 51 of the UN Charter?
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most reserved outside observers tend to ﬁnd it difﬁcult at times to refrain from
expressing disquiet.4
Consider as a ﬁrst illustration Samir Amin’s essay, ‘Whither the United Nations?’
(pp. 340–66). The history of modern international law, as Amin presents it, begins,
just as the received wisdom would have it, in 1648, with the infamous Peace of
Westphalia, a system of interrelated treaties concluded between the Holy Roman
Empire, Sweden, France, and their various confederates at the endof theThirtyYears
War that set out a series of organizational principles for the conduct of international
relations and resolution of international disputes. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, following theCongressofVienna, theConcertofEuropegraduallyextended
theWestphalian model across the rest of the European continent. Another century
later the League of Nations started making it ‘quasi-universal’ – ‘quasi’ because, as
Amin notes, the League ‘did not challenge the colonial status of Asia and Africa’ –
until, ﬁnally, with the emergence of the United Nations in 1945, an organization
‘founded on genuinely universalistic principles’, it becameprojected over thewhole
globe (p. 341).
So far, so clear, so linear, and so surprisingly reactionary. An account of interna-
tional legal history that is so unreservedly apologetic and Eurocentric as this would
certainly not have looked out of place in some 1950s-style Cold Warrior’s dogma,5
and yet Amin’s contribution to the NIL debate, as his fellow NILers explain, is sup-
posed to represent an intervention from the ‘Marxist Left’ (p. 13)! Just how exactly
a discourse that so enthusiastically ontologizes the nation-state form and so relent-
lessly avoids deploying any of the classical Marxist analytical instruments – there
is not a single paragraph anywhere in Amin’s essay that offers any sort of analysis
aiming to penetrate the reiﬁed imagery of theWestphalian system, let alone explain
its historical logic in terms of the corresponding systems of social relations, class
contradictions, or even modes of production – can be considered a typical example
of aMarxist analysis is anyone’s guess. But the idea that it is exactly that, and should
be openly recognized as such, seems to be nonetheless consistently recognized and
promoted.6
As his account moves closer to the present day and the era of the neo-imperial
global order, Amin’s story gradually takes another curious turn. Emerging in the
aftermath of a devastating international conﬂict, the UN system, he explains, was
4 See, e.g., B. Fassbender, ‘The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations’,
(2004) 15 EJIL 857.
5 The idea that the ‘Westphalian model’ had originated with the Peace of Westphalia is, of course, in reality
nothing but a twentieth-century myth. See A. Carty, The Decay of International Law (1986); D. Kennedy,
‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’, (1997) 17Quinnipiac Law Review 99;
B. Teschke, The Myth of 1648 (2003). In a similar vein, the League of Nations did not just fail to ‘challenge
the colonial status of Asia and Africa’. It actively entrenched it. See A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and
the Making of International Law (2005), 115–95. Finally, it is simply downright inaccurate to suggest that the
UN system was ‘founded on genuinely universalistic principles’. If ever there was a treaty that explicitly
legalized a global system of colonialism, the UNCharter is deﬁnitely it.Whoever doubts this should read its
Article 73.
6 Amin’s essay is not the only example that illustrates this pattern. The same presentational move can be
observed also in the case of Leo Panitch and Theo Gindin’s ‘Theorizing American Empire’ (pp. 21–43) and a
number of other similarly ‘Marxist’ texts.
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‘entrusted . . . with an historically unique and supremely important mission’ of
securing global peace and international stability andwas correspondingly construc-
ted by its founders in such a way that ‘only [those] military interventions that it
has ordered itself and that [are] carried out under its own operational and political
command’ would be considered admissible and legitimate under existing interna-
tional law. Sixty years after thismomentous act of global constitutionalism, the rise
of US foreign-policy unilateralism, which peaked with the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
has ‘threatened to ruin’ this arrangement, the only logical consequence of which,
observes Amin, will be a comprehensive destabilization of the very foundations of
international peace, security, and the rule of law (pp. 345–6).
To counteract this development, Amin concludes, all the progressive forces in the
worldmustnowunitebehindacommonprogrammeofactionwhichshould include
‘condemn[ing] theUS,NATOandG7’ for ‘appropriat[ing] responsibilities that arenot
rightfully theirs’; replacing the old absolutist concept of state sovereignty with the
new concept of the ‘sovereignty of the peoples’; rapidly expanding the system of the
international judiciary; giving more active support to the ‘courts of global public
opinion’ (such as, for example, the so-called ‘Russell Tribunal’ which exposed war
crimes during the VietnamWar); alleviating Third World debt; and, along the way,
also doing something about the looming oil and water crises, the global monetary
system, and the ILO (pp. 353–64).7
Given his established leftist credentials, it would be quite difﬁcult under any
circumstances to suspect Amin of knowingly promoting any kind of hidden right-
wing agenda. And yet, however appealing his utopian vision might seem to one’s
liberalhumanitariansentiments, thetruthaboutit is thatvirtuallyall theunderlying
claims and background assumptions onwhich it rests are either completely false or
irrevocably reactionary.
Take, for example, the idea that the UN systemwas designed in such away that it
only approves thosemilitary actions that are carried out under its ‘own operational
and political command’. It is a well-known fact that the UN has never exercised any
form of operational oversight over military actions carried out under its mandate.
The plans to set up amilitary staff committee, envisaged under Articles 46 and 47 of
the UN Charter, have never been realized in practice. All UN-approved operations
since 1945 have instead proceeded by way of ‘outsourcing’ to various ‘coalitions of
the willing’ and individual volunteering members.
Similarly, the idea that the concept of sovereignty has ever been understood in
international law in absolutist terms is simply groundless. As numerous historical
studies have shown, the whole history of the international legal system since at
least the middle of the nineteenth century has been one of an ever-progressing
‘restriction’ and ‘reduction’ of state sovereignty.8 The idea that there ever had been
such a period when the doctrine of state sovereignty in international law was
‘unfettered’ represents, against such a background, at best, an ‘invented tradition’ –
a false memory of a past that never was – at worst, a pernicious fallacy. Either
7 The same vision is also advanced in Cohen, supra note 1, at 19 ff., and La Torre, supra note 1, at 240 ff.
8 SeeM. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2002), 4–5; Kennedy, supra note 5.
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way, its ideological function in the dramatization of international law’s history,
and, in particular, the history of the UN Charter’s regime, remains quite obvious. It
promotes an essentially unwarranted lionization of the UN project and – because
projects of such scale never occur spontaneously – infuses the image of the various
professional and bureaucratic elites associated with it with a completely fabricated
sense of historical redemptiveness.
Moving to a different level, if we take, for example, the suggestion that it should
be part of the progressive global agenda today to push for the strengthening of the
international judicial architecture and various ‘courts of global public opinion’ –
both of these sets of institutions, as every attentive student of the subject would
immediately recognize, belong precisely among those basic strategies with the help
of which the neo-imperial global order is created, entrenched, and reinforced.9 If
there is anything, indeed, that one ought to be doing about the international judicial
architecture as a progressively inclined political agent under such conditions, it
must, it follows, be vigorously opposing its unchecked expansion, not supporting
it.10
One could go on and list a number of other similar points, but the bottom line
should be clear by now.Whatever Samir Amin’s personal scholarly credentialsmay
be otherwise, in its immediate substantive context his analysis of the ‘new imperial
order’ promotes anessentially reactionary ideological agenda. Between itsuncritical
acceptance of the old-line Westphalian mythology and its unreﬂective support for
supranational juridiﬁcation as the most effective weapon against neo-imperialism,
not only does it manage to propagate a completely fabricated narrative of historical
progress – the very stuff of conservative utopia – but it also distracts and redirects its
audience’s political attention towards causes andprojectswhosepursuit, in theﬁnal
analysis, is at best completely pointless, at worst, downright counterproductive.
Characteristically, though, this strange collection of ﬁctions and misdirections
is not in any sense unique or unprecedented. What one sees emerging in Amin’s
essay, rather, is a set of themes which repeat across the whole of the contemporary
NIL genre. Where exactly does this common doxa come from and what is its basic
meaning? Amin’s curious list of programmatic suggestions provides some very
interesting pointers. But in its entirety the answer to these questions, I think, can
be best developed by examining two other very representative NIL texts, written by
Amy Bartholomew (pp. 1–17) and Peter Swan (pp. 137–160) respectively.
The principal historical event aroundwhich Bartholomew’s thesis unfolds is the
emergence in the aftermath of 9/11 of the so-called ‘Bush doctrine’, the central pillar
9 See B. S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in theMaking’, (2004) 15 EJIL 1.
10 As ChinaMie´ville puts it, ‘[i]t would obviously be fatuous to deny that law could ever be put to [ideologically
progressive] reformist use . . . But the recourse to law can only ever be of limited progressive value.’ ‘At best,
it seems, in the ideological struggle for international law one can hope for occasional victories in a constant
struggle over categories. These victories, however, will be predicated on legal forms that not only make the
categories ripe for counter-appropriation, but that can only be actualized in the coercive interpretations of
the very state and other bodies whose interpretations and actions the radical lawyer is critiquing. However
persuasive the subversive interpretation, in other words, it will be the interpretation of those with power
that will inhere in the world.’ ‘The forms and relations of international law are the forms and relations of
imperialism. Attempts to reform through law can only ever tinker with the surface level of institutions.’ C.
Mie´ville, Between Equal Rights (2005), 304–17.
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of George W. Bush’s ‘New Security Strategy’ (NSS), which asserted the unilateral
right of the US government to carry out pro-democratic interventions abroad and
to engage in various pre-emptive self-defence practices. As Bartholomew sees it,
it was not so much that the rise of the Bush doctrine had ‘put at egregious risk’
the ‘values’ of ‘freedom and democracy’ as that it had severely undermined ‘the
limited but principled commitment of international legality to equal sovereignty,
a commitment that’, as she remarks, ‘reigned’ in international law throughout the
whole of the post-SecondWorldWar era (p. 3). The upshot of this development was
a replacement of what Bartholomew calls ‘the global expansion of “law’s empire”,
to adopt Ronald Dworkin’s felicitous phrase’ – a phenomenon whose origins she
traces to the Martens clause11 – with ‘another kind of project – one that is far more
menacing: the project of “empire’s law”’ (p. 2).’
Now, presuming that one really intended (as those glowing endorsements on
Empire’s Law’s back cover suggest) that one’s audience should include ‘students of
international law and politics’, one probably ought to have been somewhat more
cautious in making such remarks. Neither among practising international lawyers
nor among academics writing on international law has there ever been a tradition
of linking the idea of the international rule of law to the Martens clause. No judge,
diplomat, or scholarly commentator of any stature has lent their authority to such a
view. Not even themost heterodox Kelsenians have ever chosen theMartens clause
as their prime candidate for the grundnorm.
Moreover, oneof themostwidely recognized legal facts about thepost-1945world
public order is that neither the UN system itself nor the formal doctrine of sources
that came to complement it in the last sixty years has actually been built around the
principle of ‘equal sovereignty’.
Indeed, one need look no further than the UNCharter itself. The combined effect
of its various provisions, from Article 39 to Article 103, from its very inception,
has been to create a ﬁfteen-member body that, so long as it decided that what it
was doing qualiﬁed as ‘upholding international peace and security’, could effect-
ively command the whole of the international society of states to comply with all
and any of its demands, the only thing preventing it from formally becoming a
global Leviathan being the negative veto powers held by each of its ﬁve permanent
members, that is to say, another type of Leviathanian structure. In a similar vein,
as the landmark North Sea Continental Shelf judgment vividly demonstrates, the ba-
sic system of law-making procedures that emerged in the post-1945 international
arena openly allowed ‘specially affected states’ in each area of international law-
making to have a far greater say in determining the substantive contents of general
11 Arguably the most fundamental provision in contemporary international humanitarian law (IHL), the
Martens clause was ﬁrst inserted into the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and has since been replicated in many other IHL treaties. In its most recent formulation (Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Art. 1.2) it reads as follows: ‘In cases not covered by
this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection
and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.’
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international law than all the rest of the international community of states put
together.12
Still, the ideathat the2003Iraq invasionhadsomehowmarkedagenuinelyradical
break from the general logic of the post-SecondWorldWar international legal order
and that the essential nature of that break was a rapid movement away from the
idea of sovereign equality is repeated tirelessly from one NIL text to another.
For Jean Cohen, for example, the Iraq invasion embodied the epochal decision
by a global superpower ‘confront[ed with] one of the most multipolar moments in
history’ to enter the ‘path . . . to the political instrumentalization of “law”’ and put
to rest the existing system of international order.13
For Andrew Arato, it ‘indicate[d] that we have entered a new period where inter-
national law is no longer theprimary frameworkor reference point for democratiza-
tionprojects [since] thewar occurred in clearest possible violationof theUNCharter
[and was] opposed by the immense majority of citizens and governments the world
over’ (p. 218).
For Massimo La Torre, it spoke of an ‘explicit reject[ion]’ of the traditional ‘idea
of a general permanent organization of States associated on a footing of equality’.14
Never mind how defensible this interpretation of events might have seemed in
March 2003 – the utopian scheme whose abrupt passing La Torre laments so pas-
sionately had never been part of the actually existing international legal order,
not in 2003, not in 1989, not even in 1945 or 1648 – either in terms of its ‘living
practices’ or in terms of its fundamental structural design.15 To allege the contrary
would be toperpetuate the very samewebof hypocriticalmisrepresentationswhich
the NIL scholarship originally set out to dispel and against which it positioned
itself.
Given,however, that this ispreciselywhat seemstobehappeningacross theboard
from onemajor NIL text to another, the question that inevitably arises at this point
is: why? Or, rather – because the ‘why’ in such circumstances can only be inferred
from the ‘how’ – how exactly have these misrepresentations been actualized in the
NIL practice and what can this actualization tell us about the hidden ideological
charge of the NIL discourse with its such prominent attempts to mythologize not
only the UN Charter and the ‘UN era’ but also the very ontological foundations of
international law?16
The answer to this question, I believe, comes out most obviously in Peter Swan’s
essay ‘American Empire or Empires? Alternative Juridiﬁcations of the New World
Order’ (pp. 137–60).
According to Swan, the radical structural break which heralded the beginning
of the new imperial age consisted, essentially, of three main stages or components.
12 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] ICJ Rep. 4, paras. 73–74.
13 Cohen, supra note 1, at 3, 21.
14 La Torre, supra note 1, at 239.
15 See G. Simpson,Great Powers and Outlaw States (2004); Anghie, supra note 5.
16 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 13: ‘The global political system is dualistic, composed of sovereign states and
international law.’Thispatternofontologicallyequatinginternational lawwithstatesandthushypostatizing
it as if it were a political subject is quite typical not only of Cohen’s argument but of the NIL discourse as a
whole. Cf. Bartholomew’s misappropriation of Dworkin’s ‘law’s empire’ (p. 2).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
456 REVIEW ESSAYS
The ﬁrst was the issuance of the NSS. As Swan sees it, the proclamation of the Bush
doctrine ‘pushed [the US] challenge to traditional international legal limitations
on the use of force’ to completely unprecedented heights (p. 141). Given that these
limitations, he continues, had previously managed to secure some ‘60 years of
relative peace’ in the international arena (p. 137), even a lesser challenge to them
could not but have themost dangerous and far-reaching ramiﬁcations. In the event,
however, the NSS not only topped everything that had come before it, it also came
accompanied by a pair of further developments.
The second component of the radical break, remarks Swan, became most prom-
inent when just after the statute of the newly established International Crim-
inal Court (ICC) entered into force, the United States refused to allow any of
its troops to be brought within its jurisdiction. As Swan explains, what this
refusal had essentially signiﬁed was the rapid crystallization in the contem-
porary international affairs of a veritable regime of US ‘legal exceptionalism’
(p. 143).
TogetherwiththeBushadministration’sactionsinGuanta´namo,thisthenquickly
precipitated the third structural stage – what, after Giorgio Agamben, Swan calls
the rise of the ‘permanent state of exception’ – a state of affairs in international
politics in which ‘not only decisions about war and peace but also decisions af-
fecting the constitutional rights of individuals’ ‘are made not in accordance with
the law, but “outside the law” as an extension of emergency powers’ (pp. 138,
144).17
Attractive as Swan’s argument may seem at ﬁrst sight, one does not need
much critical acumen to see why it should be approached with considerable
suspicion.
In the ﬁrst place, the ‘60 years of relative peace’ that preceded the arrival of the
NSS is, in fact, a period that includes not only Korea, Suez, Vietnam, the Bay of
Pigs, Bangladesh, and Nicaragua, but also Algeria, Angola, the Iran–Iraq war, the
Soviet ‘incursions’ into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, Vietnam’s own
invasion of Cambodia, Kuwait, Grenada, and Eritrea. And all this before one even
gets to Kashmir, Palestine, the wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and
all those countless international conﬂicts that have not been commonly recog-
nized as such, from the ‘revolt’ against Mossadeq in 1953 to the Congo ‘mission’ in
1964.
Furthermore, however villainous the ideologues of the Bush administrationmay
have appeared – and they certainly are not a very endearing group of individuals –
they were nowhere near as visionary or inventive as to have been able to produce
a piece of policy so fundamentally novel that it could ‘push the traditional inter-
national legal limitations on the use of force’ to places where they had not been
pushed before. The pre-1989 international legal order may have looked very dif-
ferent from what had come to replace it by the mid-2000s, but the idea that a
17 See also, more generally, G. Agamben, State of Exception (2005).
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superpower could regularly engage in a certain amount of unilateral intervention-
ism aswell as deliver a pre-emptive strike against its arch-enemieswas certainly not
alien to it.
At least since themid-1950s, on both sides of the ColdWar divide, the hegemonic
privilege of a global superpower to intervene at will to promote its preferred ideo-
logical vision abroad was commonly treated as an integral, if not exactly regularly
advertised, part of theobjective reality of the existing international order. InUSprac-
tice, this idea was articulated in the language of ‘pro-democratic invasions’. On the
Soviet side, thepreferrednomenclaturewas that of ‘international socialist duty’. The
former was known in international law as the Reagan (and before that the Truman)
doctrine, and the latter, appropriately enough, as the Brezhnev doctrine. However
one feels about this, there was nothing unprecedented or historically unique in the
juridical logic of the NSS. It certainly did not ‘mark something new in the annals of
American Empire’ (p. 4).
The same holds true for the ICC example.What Swan identiﬁes as the archetypal
case of ‘American exceptionalism’ turns out, on closer scrutiny, to be a policy ad-
opted also by a number of other states. Does their continuing refusal to ratify the
Rome Statute indicate that China and Russia are also trying to create ‘islands’ of
Chinese and Russian exceptionalism in the sea of international law? What about
Israel? Or Iran? How many exceptionalisms can one afford to admit before the im-
plied imagery of a malicious global bully ‘explicitly afﬁrm[ing]’ its ‘contempt for
international law’ (p. 143) disintegrates under the weight of its own conceptual
pretensions?
Last but not least, however charitably one reads it, the whole Agambenian argu-
ment – the thesis that between the NSS and Guanta´namo the Bush administration
somehow managed to create for itself a realm ‘outside the law’ – seems at best a
proposition of a rather ‘disputable philosophy’.18 To be sure, the underlying rhetor-
ical trope does create a pretty striking metaphoric imagery. But the juristic concept
which it conveys and by which it is ‘inspired’ is essentially meaningless. It has no
critical value as a theoretical category. The only ideational effect which it can gen-
erate is a self-perpetuating natural-legalist mystiﬁcation. And it certainly serves no
practical legal-analytical purpose of any kind.
Indeed, if we look at it closely, it seems to derive from a completely dubious
juristic vision that rests on aprofoundmisunderstandingof the basic organizational
logic of international law-making as well as a deliberate inattention to what one
might call the ‘inner life of the law’ more generally. That is to say, the indispensable
analytical conditions of its theoretical sustainability – that murky set of logical
corollaries which, in the words of Fredric Jameson, allow ‘what can be thought to
seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable . . .
which lies beyond its boundaries’19 – include a complete disregard not just of the
18 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, at 621
(‘wemust not present the moral criticism of institutions as propositions of a disputable philosophy’).
19 F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious (2002), 38.
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way inwhich the rules of general international law are actuallymade and amended.
What is required for the Agambenian juristic theory to hold together is also a
systematic disregard of the basic structural relationships linking background and
foreground legal norms, jural correlatives and jural opposites, rules of prohibition
and rules of permission, ‘law on the books’ and ‘law in action’, the ‘living law’20 and
the positive legal order.
Put differently, one would have to strike out the whole of the great modernist
tradition in contemporary legal theory – from Wesley Hohfeld and Eugen Ehrlich
to Hans Kelsen, Herbert Hart, and Roberto Unger – before one even gets to that
theoretical level at which the Agambenian argument startsmaking any perceptible
sense.21
For, indeed, unless one adopts a grotesquely natural-legalist conception of
international law – so that any state of affairs which diverges from this aprioristic
code of substantively determined rights andwrongswouldhave to be automatically
discounted as ‘non-law’ – none of the policies pursued by the Bush administration
in the post-9/11 era can, by any rationalmeasure, be described as an attempt tomove
‘outside international law’. Whether one talks about Guanta´namo or the doctrine
of pre-emptive self-defence, what the Bush administration had consistently tried to
achieve throughout its two terms in ofﬁcewas a change in the substantive contents
of the respective international legal regimes, not a suspension of the international
legal order altogether. (It was, in fact, quite enthusiastic about every aspect of the
WTO law.) One may not like the substance of the various new rules that it tried to
postulate and push through, but none of this can detract from the fact that these
postulations were designed as legal rules and that the regimes created on their back
were all intended as legal regimes (and, crucially, operated that way too).22 Indeed, to
insist otherwisewould in itself be a deeply suspect act. The only objective purpose it
would servewouldbe to instil anunwarranted sense of ‘romantic optimism’ (Hart)23
and to cover up the fact that, far from being a regrettable aberration, the world of
Guanta´namo, the Bush doctrine, and ‘torturememos’ was, in fact, a world created in
accordance with law (Mie´ville24).
NIL’s failure to produce accurate descriptions and to assign coherent theoretical
categories to some of the most elementary facts of international legal practice, in
20 E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936), 493–506.
21 This is not, admittedly, themost charitable reading ofAgamben’s legal-theoretical argument. For other,more
generous takes, see, e.g., D. McLoughlin, ‘In Force without Signiﬁcance: Kantian Nihilism and Agamben’s
Critique of Law’, (2009) 20 Law and Critique 245; J. Whyte, ‘“I Would Prefer Not To”: Giorgio Agamben,
Bartleby, and the Potentiality of Law’, (2009) 20 Law and Critique 309; T. Zartaloudis,Giorgio Agamben, Power,
Law and the Uses of Criticism (2010). See also, more generally, P. Fitzpatrick and P. Tuitt (eds.), Critical Beings:
Law, Nation and the Global Subject (2004).
22 See, e.g., F. Jones, ‘Guanta´namo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, (2005) 16 EJIL 613.
23 Hart, supranote 18, at 620: ‘The vice of this use of the principle that, at certain limiting points, what is utterly
immoral cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to cloak the true nature of the problemswith whichwe
are faced and will encourage the romantic optimism that all the values we cherish ultimately will ﬁt into a
single system, that no one of them has to be sacriﬁced or compromised to accommodate another.’
24 Mie´ville, supranote 10, at 319: ‘Aworld structured around international law cannot but be one of imperialist
violence. The chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of law’ (emphasis in original).
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the end, though, is neither peripheral nor accidental. On the contrary, it constitutes
an integral component of the whole structure of the NIL discourse.
Consider once more Habermas’s essay in Empire’s Law. About one-third into his
argument, he comes to comparing the 2003 Iraq invasion with the 1999 NATO
campaign in Kosovo. While the 2003 intervention was clearly both illegal and il-
legitimate under modern international law, the 1999 intervention, for Habermas,
was different, in that the ‘undisputed democratic and rule-of-law character of all the
members of the acting military coalition’ that led the Kosovo campaign had sub-
sequently overturned that intervention’s fundamental illegality, or at least ‘offered
[it a] legitimation after the fact’ (p. 46).25 The notion that the Kosovo campaign was
somehowfundamentally distinct fromthe Iraq invasion in termsof its international
legitimacy seems to represent a common theme across many NIL writings.26 Curi-
ously enough,however, the actual reasoningbehind this argument is virtuallynever
articulated with any precision. The only relevant distinction Habermas ﬁnds it pos-
sible to make between the two cases is the differing compositions of the respective
intervening coalitions. Kosovo, though illegal, in the bigger scheme of things was
still somehow okay in a way in which Iraq was not, because ‘all the members of the
actingmilitary coalition’ in that case had an ‘undisputed democratic and rule-of-law
character’.
Now, try to imagine what this line of reasoning looks like to a typical ‘student
of international law and politics’, the alleged core of Empire’s Law’s target audience.
Think about what sort of historical references it is most likely going to evoke: when
‘old Europe’ comes on board, interventions are legitimate; when it refuses, they are
not; meanwhile, the identity of the intervening coalition can by itself legitimize
otherwise patently illegal invasions.27 A little more than a hundred years ago, the
two principal ideas in conjunction with which this kind of rhetoric was normally
used were commonly known under the headings of the ‘standard of civilization’
and the ‘white man’s burden’. European states were ‘civilized’ because they had
liberal governance structures and a rule-of-law culture. Non-European states were
‘uncivilized’ because theyhadneither. The latter, consequently, couldnever be equal
to the former,whichmeant that theycouldnotbe regardedas fully sovereign.And,of
course, only a fully sovereign state can have any real say over its formal status under
international law. Enter the doctrine of the ‘civilizingmission’ and the concomitant
right of colonial conquest – by Europe, of everyone else.28
25 The same point is made even more forcefully in ‘America and the World: A Conversation with Ju¨rgen
Habermas’, available at http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/mendieta.htm.
26 See, e.g., I. Johnstone, ‘US–UN Relations after Iraq: The End of theWorld (Order) as We Know It?’, (2004) 15
EJIL 813; La Torre, supra note 1, at 251 (‘the Iraq war is a turning point in the building of [the new imperial
order]’).
27 Or, asHabermasputs it onadifferent occasion, it is all about being a liberal state ‘whoseorganizingprinciples
comport with the principles of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights’ (supra note 25).
28 On the ‘standard of civilization’ see further Anghie, supra note 5, at 84–6; Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at
127–36; G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (1984).
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2. THE INTERTEXTUALITY OF NIL
Howdidascholarwithsuchalong-standingleft-wingreputationasJu¨rgenHabermas
come to advocate the resumption of such a reactionary political concept as the
standard of civilization? How did legal theorists as otherwise sophisticated in their
thinking as Massimo La Torre end up propagating such a primitive conception of
international law? As self-evident as questions like these may seem to be, they are
not, I believe, what we should turn our attention to now. In part this is so because
chasing them will not lead us anywhere other than to empty speculations. But in
part it is so also because, on themost basic level, the really important insight lies in
a completely different dimension – howevermuchwemay focus on the immediate
surface of NIL narratives, in the end what makes that surface cohere, what silently
towers in the background over the whole totality of the various meanings that are
carried within it, is a series of patterns and devices that belong to a completely
different semiotic register.
Perhaps the best place to start explaining this would be with the general concept
of intertextuality. Here, for instance, is how Michel Foucault tried to deﬁne it: ‘The
frontiers of a book’, he wrote, can never be found within the book itself: ‘beyond
the title, the ﬁrst lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal conﬁguration and
its autonomous form’, every book is ‘caught up in a system of references to other
books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network’.29 One can ﬁnd
many alternative deﬁnitions of intertextuality,30 but this one will certainly do for
the purposes of the argument I want to make here.
What is the basic idea behind the concept of intertextuality? Texts do not exist in
isolation, they always come as already integrated parts of some greater whole, some
broader discursive formation, which, by and large, operates as a gravitational ﬁeld.
Each text that is released into an open discursive circulation acquires its meaning
through its relational positioning vis-a`-vis all the other texts that circulate in the
same discursive ﬁeld. Where exactly within that ﬁeld it gets ‘caught up’ – and how
exactly itsmeaningwill beﬁxed– isnot thus something that isdecidedby thewishes
of its author, but by the general structure of that ﬁeld’s currently active system of
references, that is to say, the second-order semiotic conventions that developwithin
it.
What kind of conventions are these? To put it in a somewhat schematic way,
everydiscursiveﬁeldoperateson thebasis of a certain repertoireof commontropes–
argument patterns and templates that are used more regularly than others by its
participants. Over time, in response to the internal politics of the ﬁeld, someof these
tropes become associatedwith particular intellectual and ideological positions, and
certain topics and debates constructed that way come then to be seen asmetonymic
stand-ins or proxies for other, much broader questions and themes. Depending
on how exactly each given text’s principal narrative hinge-points align with the
broader pattern of such metonymic associations, the text in question comes to
29 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 23.
30 See G. Allen, Intertextuality (2000).
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acquire both its current location within the surrounding web of references and its
practicalmeaning in the eyes of that ﬁeld’s participants, the combination of the two
becoming the foundation for its external ideological functionality, that is to say, the
general range of political projects and roles to the pursuit of which it comes to lend
itself most readily.
Whatever preferences one may have as an author concerning how one’s writ-
ings ought to be understood by their readers, in the larger scheme of things, thus
remains fundamentally irrelevant. The only meaningful goal one can try to pur-
sue in such circumstances would be to ‘pre-ﬁt’ one’s text to the ﬁeld around it by
hazarding a more or less informed guess about the current patterns of metonymic
associations adopted within it and pitching the tone of one’s writing accordingly.
For something like that to becomepossible, however, it would be necessary not only
to map out the respective ﬁeld in terms of its component networks of intertextual
references but also to grasp the immanent logic of its currently active pattern of
associations.
Put differently, the basic analytical insight that the concept of intertextuality
supplies, and in which, to my mind, is carried the ultimate answer to the whole
phenomenon of NIL scholarship is that each text, in the end, is nothing more than
an object-effect of its current intertextual location, a product of the conceptual and
rhetorical projections that enter its semiotic space from all the various nodal points
that surround it and constitute its background system of references.
What are the main intertextual nodes that structure the broader discursive ﬁeld
in which NIL writings take place?
To mymind, the best place from which to start thinking about this question is a
short (andundeservedly underappreciated) article published by SusanMarks in this
journal seven years ago.31 Marks’s central thesis was surprisingly simple but also
incredibly lucid. All modern writings that aim to explore the logic of the structural
relationship between ‘law’ and ‘empire’ in the end invariably come down to three
principal master-narratives, each of which is built around its own distinct concept
of ‘empire’ and a corresponding theory of ‘law’. Although each of these three visions
of ‘empire’ depicts the basic referent behind that term in profoundly negative terms,
what makes it possible to speak here not simply about three different aspects of
the same idea but about three different concepts is that each of these referents
comes ‘pre-ﬁtted’ into a distinct plot formula constructed to create a very speciﬁc
distribution of meanings and, by implication, theoretical impulses. Since each of
these plot formulae ultimately culminates in a very particular bottom-linemessage
that legitimates a very particular vision of history, what all of thismeans in practice,
concludes Marks, is that choosing between the three concepts of ‘empire’ entails
choosing not only between three completely different emplotment logics (in Hayden
White’s terms) but also between three completely different ranges of ideological
functionality.
31 S. Marks, ‘Three Concepts of Empire’, (2003) 16 LJIL 901.
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The oldest – and for most international lawyers probably the most famil-
iar – way to emplot the story of law’s relationship with ‘empire’ is by equat-
ing the latter with the nineteenth-century system of European colonialism and
the former with the liberal-internationalist theory of self-determination.32 Seen
from this perspective, the basic relationship between ‘law’ and ‘empire’ comes
across essentially as a relationship of fundamental conﬂict and opposition. The
more ‘law’ had found its voice, the more it rose in opposition to ‘empire’, chal-
lenging it and steadily encroaching on its domain, until eventually, with the
adoption of the epochal UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) in 1961, it
delivered theﬁnal victorious blow, bringing thewhole colonial system to its rightful
end.
In terms of its ideological effect, this empire-as-European-colonialism formula
quite obviously has a very strong predisposition towards reinforcing the general
progress narrative adopted by the transnational liberal elites. In addition to that,
however, it also implicitly entrenches a highly mystiﬁed vision of international
law and the international legal order. To put it in a rather schematic fashion, the
conception of the law promoted by this formula portrays international law not just
as a particular form of social control or a modality for practising global politics, but
as some sort of an animated entity that has both an independent will of its own and a
distinct political agenda.
One does not need to be specially schooled in ideologematic analysis to guess
what sort of general political effects such amystiﬁcationism tends toproduce. In the
ﬁrst place, it tends to encourage an excessively cheerful viewof both the historically
achieved anti-colonial developments and international law’s general capacity as an
instrument of emancipation in this process. In the second place, it unabashedly
sanctiﬁes the whole past record of the liberal-internationalist project, conveniently
covering up along the way the fact of its historical centrality to the actual advance-
mentof thatvery systemofEuropeancolonialismthat itnowdenounces. In the third
place, and far more importantly, it tends also to spread a profoundly false sense of
security – and thus helps strengthen the culture of quietism– in the anti-imperialist
camp. It does that not simply inasmuch as it suggests that the ‘ﬁght’ against global
imperialism has already been won, or inasmuch as it misrepresents the historical
reality of imperialismbyportraying it in suchnarrow terms, but because it promises
that international law itself somehow ‘stands against’ global imperialism, as if there
were something inherent in the very character of the ‘legal form’ thatmade legalism
inimical to imperialism.
On the most immediate level, of course, such a promise is simply unrealizable.
Whatever one understands international law to mean, it means, inter alia, a certain
body of legal rules. Rules, as every practising lawyer knows all too well, are deeply
imperfect tools. They are porous and often conﬂict with one another. Many of them
are vague. Many more are saddled with ill-deﬁned exceptions. Both of these condi-
tions create a strong systemic predisposition towards self-serving interpretations.
32 For a summary, see A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (1995).
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Those rules that do not suffer fromexcessive vagueness are almost always either too
over- or under-inclusive in terms of their jurisdictional reach or are, alternatively,
so rigid and inﬂexible in terms of their prescriptive content as to make the achieve-
ment of any real-life compromises and peaceful adjustment of outcomes among the
participating players virtually impossible.
Much more importantly, however, the whole vision behind this promise is also
deeply reactionary. AsDavidKennedy observes in a similar context, the idea that the
anti-imperialist cause can bewon by ‘international law’ ‘rather than peoplemaking
political decisions [not only] encourages [us to seek] emancipation through reliance
on enlightened, professional elites with “knowledge” of rights and wrongs’ – in the
sameway inwhichmedieval Christians sought redemption through reliance on the
infallible Church – it also alienates us from ourselves and from the realities of our
own political actions, roles, histories, and capacities.33
The second most common tradition of representing the relationship between ‘law’
and ‘empire’, observes Marks, proceeds from the assumption that the latter should
be generally understood in terms of the current geopolitical status occupied by the
United States as ‘the world’s only superpower’. The basic narrative formula that
emerges on the basis of this assumption shareswith its predecessor the aspiration to
portraythehistoryoflaw’srelationshipwithempireintermsofagrandmetaphysical
conﬂict. This time, however, it is the ‘empire’ which is understood to have harvested
the fruits of victory, the boycott of the Kyoto protocol, the ‘un-signing’ of the ICC
Statute, and the establishment of the Guanta´namo prison being the regular ‘proofs’
of its unimpededmarch over the vanquished body of ‘law’.
Needless to say, the basic ideological functionality of this emplotment strategy
radically differs from that of its rival. To be sure, on the one hand, international
law is once again presented as a deeply mystiﬁed transcendental entity that has
a certain ahistorical substance as well as a stable sense of identity. On the other
hand, this time it is seen to be both a subject (the opponent of ‘empire’) and an object
(that which ‘empire’ has trampled). Given the basic plot formula – ‘empire’ ran into
‘law’, smashed it, and then bludgeoned it into submission – this representational
duality becomes increasingly crucial insofar as its effect is basically to suggest that
whatever the ontological status of ‘law’may be, it cannot, under any circumstances,
be counted on to repeat the same remarkable feat which its namesake achieved in
the ﬁrst master-narrative. That is to say, if ‘empire’ is to be thwarted, ‘law’ somehow
needs to be helped in its noble ﬁght.
The principal question that arises at this point, then, is: who exactly is supposed
to be this ‘helper’? Which actor or group of actors is supposed to attend to the task
of liberating ‘law’ from its oppression by ‘empire’? To see how the second tradition
tends to address this question, let us turn to a brief illustration.
33 DavidKennedy, ‘The InternationalHumanRightsMovement: Partof theProblem?’, (2002)15HarvardHuman
Rights Journal 101, at 116–17.
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3. NIL AS FEUDAL SOCIALISM
Noneof theNILwritings illustrates the internal logicof thesecondtradition’sgeopol-
itical assumptionsmore revealingly than the evocatively titled essay inEmpire’s Law
by theGermanprofessor and judge,Ulrich Preuss, ‘The IraqWar: Critical Reﬂections
from “Old Europe”’ (pp. 52–67).
The principal question to which Preuss seeks an explanation is: why exactly
do ‘Americans’ always end up going to war whenever they feel their security is
fundamentally threatened while ‘Europeans’ do not? The answer, he decides, must
be sought in the cultural origins of the American psyche. From James Madison
onwards, writes Preuss, ‘Americans’ have been obsessed with the idea of ‘absolute
security’. What this translated to in terms of policy preferences, inevitably, was a
preoccupation with pursuing complete ‘independence from any power or alliance,
friendly or not’, and a keenness for ‘military responses to [all] perceived threats’. Add
to this the fact that ‘Americans’ have never managed to grow out of their infantile
‘sense of superiority’ derived from the ‘deep religious conviction of being a chosen
people’ – a character trait they inherited from the Pilgrim Fathers – and what you
get in practice, concludes Preuss, is several generations of political eliteswho are not
only incredibly difﬁcult to reasonwith but are also essentially incapable of resisting
the temptations of aggressive unilateralism on a virtually subconscious level (pp.
53, 65).
‘Europeans’, on the other hand, he observes, have historically inclined in the
direction of a much more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Measured and
balanced, the ‘European’way, has remained immune to absolutist logics. The reason
for this is that, unlike the ‘Americans’, ‘Europeans’ eventually woke up to the idea
that ‘Rousseau will [always] prevail against Hobbes’, that is to say, that ‘soft power’
will always be more effective than ‘hard power’ (p. 67).
It is the failure of the ‘Americans’ to learn this lesson, concludes Preuss, that
ultimately explains their aggressive imperialist tendencies in the post-Cold War
era. This being the problem, the solution then seems rather self-evident: ‘The “old”
Europe that has become wise should not become tired of showing [Rousseau’s]
insight to its American friends’ (p. 67).
Leave aside for themoment the curiously patronizing toneof this last remark and
focus insteadon theactual logicbehindPreuss’s argument. TheAmerican state acts in
themode of aggressive unilateralismbecause that is, essentially,what the ‘American
people’ always do. They just cannot help it; it comes with their Pilgrim-Father gene.
The best way to tame this trend (and to save the multilateralist cause), however, is
not to resist it, but to charge thewise ‘old Europe’ to teach itsAmerican counterparts
the value of the European pragmatic approach.
Pause for a second now and retrace these steps. At the dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst
century, the United States turned into a global bully not because George W. Bush’s
ﬁrst administration included too many hawks, nor because such a foreign policy
beneﬁted the immediate interests of a certain sector of the Usonian ruling classes,
nor even because imperial wars have always been a great source of opportunity
for various segments of the global industrial capital – but because that is what the
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AmericanVolkgeistmade it do. There exists, in otherwords, some kind of a nefarious
national-cultural DNA shared by all Americans (including second-generation im-
migrants suchasColinPowell) that over the courseof the last fourhundredyearshas
determined the basic logic of all US foreign-policy actions, overriding every other
history-formative factor,be it the fallingrateofproﬁtor the individual idiosyncrasies
of various commanders-in-chief.
Tempting as it may feel at this point simply to dismiss this whole argument
tout court, doing so, I believe, would be quite mistaken. First, despite its obvious
absurdity, Preuss’s account of the essential nature and logic of ‘US imperialism’ is
not, in fact, nearly as unrepresentative of the general consensus in certain circles
in the ‘old Europe’ as many on the European secular left normally like to think.
In the second place, the general model of history on which Preuss’s account is
based is not actually a product of mild delirium, but rather the offspring of a very
distinguished philosophical tradition. In basic structural terms, it has the same
intellectual roots as Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the whole
of the post-9/11 ofﬁcial discourse of the ‘war on terror’, which is to say, essen-
tially, that genealogically it can be traced all the way back to Hegel, Herder, and
Savigny.
Politicians, lawyers, and community leaders make whatever decisions they do
not because they respond to external pressures, but because it is their national
cultural identitywhich, like somekindof ademoniacentity thathas takenover their
possessedbodies,makes themact thatway–howoftenhas thiskindofmystiﬁcatory
gibberish been presented in recent years in various parts of the European public
discourse as the de facto most effective explanation not only of US foreign policy,
but also of the whole of the global political arena andmodern history? Just think of
the general drift one gets in the mainstream European media these days whenever
it turns its attention to Russia’s gas rows with Ukraine or its ‘invasion’ of Georgia.
Or of China’s relationship with Tibet. Or, for that matter, any aspect of the ‘Islamic
question in Europe’.
Just as in the legal-theoretical discourse, as Diego Lopez Medina correctly points
out, one has to draw a consistent categorical distinction between ‘high legal theory’
and ‘pop jurisprudence’,34 so, too, in the politico-theoretical discourse one must
constantly distinguish between ‘highpolitical theory’ and ‘poppolitical paradigms’.
Preussian neo-Herderianism will never ﬁnd any solid ground under the former
heading. But in the case of ‘pop political paradigms’ the situation is completely
different, and in the end it is always the latter that supply the ideationalmaterial for
the production of mass ideologies.
To be sure, the ‘old Europeans’ are not the only signiﬁcant fan base behind this
neo-Herderian revival. But the fact that theneo-Herderianmasterplots typically tend
to identify ‘old Europe’ as the ultimate vanguard of the global historical progress is
certainly not inconsequential.
34 D. Lopez-Medina, Teoria Impura de Derecho (2004).
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AtthestartofthethirdchapterofTheCommunistManifesto,KarlMarxandFriedrich
Engels observe that among the several existing strands of socialism one of the
most notable ones is ‘feudal socialism’. Compared with other types of socialism,
it is characterized chieﬂy by the fact that it represents a profoundly hypocritical
movement. As the defeated feudalist class tries to ﬁnd a new way of attacking the
bourgeoisie, unable to rely on its ‘organic themes’ it comes to produce a discourse
of fake indignation on behalf of the proletarian masses. Seen in this context, one
could say that feudal socialism represents what in Nietzschean terms can be called
a product of the collective ressentiment: the reaction of the old aristocracy which
despises the new bourgeois upstarts and is deeply envious of their ﬂourishing, but
which also knows that it stands no real chance of defeating them in an open inter-
hegemonic contest and so resorts instead to the cunningways of two-faced sabotage.
The real logic which animates the feudal socialist reasoning, as Marx and Engels
note, is not so much that the capitalist oppression of the proletariat is inherently
bad in itself, but that it is bad because it is not the feudalist class but the bourgeoisie
that beneﬁts the most from this oppression:
What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a proletariat
as that it creates a revolutionary proletariat. In political practice, therefore, they join
in all coercive measures against the working class; and in ordinary life, despite their
highfalutin phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples dropped from the tree of
industry, and to barter truth, love, and honour, for trafﬁc in wool, beetroot-sugar, and
potato spirits.35
The parallels with theNIL case are obvious and hardly requiremuch elaboration.
Substitute ‘United States’ for the bourgeoisie, ‘old Europe’ for the aristocracy, and
‘Third World’ for the proletariat and you get the general picture. The aristocracy
rebukes the bourgeoisie for mistreating the proletariat, aiming to position itself as
the morally superior enlightener against the former’s unscrupulous proﬁt-chasers.
‘Old Europe’ rebukes the ‘American empire’ for lawlessly invading and exploiting
ThirdWorld countries, aiming to position itself as themorally superior enlightener
– all the while happily continuing to beneﬁt fromwhatever unequal terms of trade
the ‘American empire’ secures for theWest in its dealings with the ThirdWorld.
The central question at theheart of the second traditionofwriting about ‘law’ and
‘empire’, as I noted above, was: who is going to be the law’s helper? Notice howNIL
authors have tended to frame the answer to this question. When the United States
‘went it alone’ in Iraq in 2003, the invasion was unquestionably illegal. When the
intervention was approved of by ‘Europe’ (as was the case in Kosovo in 1999), it was
at the very least ‘legitimizable after the fact’.
Notice also what tends to be implicitly identiﬁed here as ‘Europe’ – or rather
which particular historical and ideological legacies of the peoples of the European
continent tend to be included into the imagery behind that wise ‘old Europe’ that
Preuss has inmind and howmuch room there is left in this vision of ‘Europeanness’
for the historical legacy of, say, the Polish Jews, the Hungarian Roma, the Turkish
35 The Communist Manifesto: AModern Edition (1998), 64.
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diaspora in post-1989 Germany, or the Irish dockers in 1920s London – indeed, any
segment of the working class.
Whateveronemight feel about its ideologicalpedigree, theNILvisionofEurope is
a socialmodel extrapolated froma society that appears tohaveno religious or ethnic
minorities, noundernourishedandnounemployed,no radicals andnocommunists,
no fascists and no anarchists. Or, rather, a society that, even where it does include
any of these groups, ultimately, allows none of them to be remembered, to have
their visions added to the constitution of that society’s common self-image. For how
else can one explain that between Hobbes and Rousseau one seems to have lost not
only Marx and Sartre, but also Kropotkin and Freud, St Paul and Muhammad, Leon
Trostky and Israel ben Eliezer, Jules Harmand and Jo¨rg Haider?
4. EMPIRE-AS-GLOBALIZATION
The starting point of the third master-narrative about ‘law’ and ‘empire’, as Marks
observes, is a post-structuralist reappropriation of the classical Leninist concept of
imperialism. A typical example of what such an approach entails can be found in
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000): at some point following the end
of the Cold War, the development of global capitalism entered a qualitatively new
stage, bringing to life an entirely novel system of global governance which does
not lend itself to easy summary, especially through the traditional vocabularies of
‘statehood’ and ‘territory’. The political horizon of this new system has neither an
identiﬁable centre nor an identiﬁable limit. It is not dominated by any particular
state, class, or nation. It has no ‘outside’, which means it leaves no space, social
or geographical, to which one can withdraw or retreat. It is, at root, a rhizomatic
network, and its apparatus of rule is decentred, kaleidoscopic, heterogeneous, and
irreducible to any single master-plan. Everyone and everything is always/already
captured inside it, including, crucially, law and legal institutions.
Needless to say, one can ﬁnd quite a few problems with this sort of approach.
This is not the place to detail them.36 What matters more for our purposes is that
this way of thinking about ‘empire’, as Marks observes, tends to train its users to
view legal phenomena in much less mystiﬁed terms than the two rival traditions.
A large part of this comes from the fact that it does not project the relationship
between ‘law’ and ‘empire’ in terms of a metaphysical conﬂict. The third concept of
‘empire’ is essentially synonymouswith the ideaof ‘globalization’ and ‘as soonas [the
idea of empire] is used to refer to the political order associated with contemporary
globalization’, observes Marks, ‘it becomes clear that, far from international law
and institutions being against empire, or empire being against them, empire and
international law and institutions are for one another’.37 Like two limbs of the same
body, they are locked in a profoundly symbiotic relationship, sometimes helping
and enabling one another, sometimes constraining and hampering each other’s
development.
36 See G. Balakrishnan,Debating ‘Empire’ (2004).
37 Marks, supra note 31, at 903 (emphasis in original).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
468 REVIEW ESSAYS
The basic plot formula which the third concept of ‘empire’ invites its users to
construct is, as one would expect, deeply de-romanticized. One will ﬁnd here no
heroes and no villains, no victims and no promises of an easy redemption. What
is slowly uncovered instead is a sharply sobering realization that not only has
international law always had a deeply ambivalent relationship to imperial power,
but that it is also neither a subject nor an object, but only a speciﬁcally organized
form of global collective life, a form throughwhich one can pursue an unabashedly
hegemonic project as well as a trenchantly counter-hegemonic resistance – a quasi-
linguistic systemwhich ‘enables the taking of any conceivable position in regard to
a dispute or a problem’ but which does not itself prescribe any.38
To be sure, each ‘form’ comes with its own residual ‘content’. The use of law as a
political medium does not work as easily on the counter-hegemonic side as it does
on the side of the ‘imperial power’. Both as a language and as a system of rules and
institutions, international law as we know it today seems to have a strong intrinsic
‘tilt’39 that favours the interests of the global capitalist historic bloc.40 But that does
not in itself undo the fact that it is still ‘only’ an inanimate form. Inanimate forms
never ‘do’ anything on their own. One always needs to enlist a speaking subject
before the language can be used to articulate anything.
All of this points, in the end, to the general ideological functionality of the third
tradition. Provided some of itsmore outlandish tendencies are duly bracketed out,41
the post-structuralist reconceptualization of ‘law’ and ‘empire’ by and large tends
to produce a considerably more progressive range of ideological functionality than
either of its two main rivals. By highlighting the essentially symbiotic relationship
between international law and imperialism and the concomitant indispensability
of constantly stressing the all-important role of the subjective element (the speaker
of the language), the third tradition has the potential of enabling its audiences not
only to preserve a considerable amount of intellectual and rhetorical energy that
otherwise gets routinely wasted in the two other traditions, but also to proceed
much more self-consciously towards the actual pragmatic challenge of identify-
ing what exactly can and needs to be done to advance the counter-hegemonic
anti-imperialist project through the instrumentality of the international legal
form.
None of the NIL writings takes up the third concept of ‘empire’. The dominant
preference rather lies with the formula of empire-as-US-hegemony and the basic
model of the feudal-socialist reasoning it induces. (And even on those occasions
when the latter’s inﬂuence is somehow resisted, the ideological effect of reducing
the historical reality of the new imperial order to a crude outline of the Usonian
inter-statal dominance still remains quite devastating. Not only does it obscure the
fact that the stability of the United States’ hegemonic position is, in fact, directly
38 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (2005), 564.
39 W. Holt, ‘Tilt’, (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 280; E. Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and
Law (1980).
40 Although, of course, we can argue about the actual limits of this tilt at rather considerable length. Compare
Mie´ville’s argument with Koskenniemi’s. See Mie´ville, supra note 10, at 48–60.
41 A. Rasulov, ‘International Law and the Poststructuralist Challenge’, (2006) 19 LJIL 799, at 806–8, 815–16.
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predicated on its continuous support by a number of other First World powers; it
also severely misrepresents the general condition of the global political arena by
suggesting, in effect, that the sole line of division that splits it is that between the
United States and the rest of the world. One only needs to pay close attention to the
scale and intensity of the various ‘trade wars’ – bananas, steel, biotech products –
between the United States and the European Union throughout the last decade and
a half to see just how inaccurate that picture is already at the FirstWorld end of the
spectrum.)
Even in those NIL texts which are supposed to have been written in the voice
of the ‘Marxist Left’, there is not a page to be found anywhere of a serious critical
analysis attempting to penetrate the fetishistic rigidity of the second tradition, let
alone to question the ideological attractiveness of that tradition to the hegemonic
requirements of global capitalism.42
For, indeed, from the Marxist point of view, every global imperial structure is
supposed to be understood, ﬁrst and foremost, as a historical solution worked out
at the ‘political’ level in response to the fundamental contradictions of the corres-
ponding globally dominantmode of production occurring at the ‘economic’ level.43
In the present context, this would mean at the very least an attempt to address and
connect between themselves such trends and events as, for instance, the continuous
rise of new ﬁnance monopolies since the end of the 1980s; the deregulation of the
global commodity and labour markets; the privatization of public services and the
roll-back of thewelfare state in theNorthAtlantic region; the de-industrialization of
the advanced capitalist economies and the increasingmarginalization of the global
industrial capital within the dominant historical bloc; the rise of the ﬂoating rate of
exchangemodel in global currencymarkets and the polarization of income in both
the developed and the developing world; the onset of the ‘credit crunch’; the credit
crunch-inspired retreat from the neoliberal vision of economic development back
in the direction of the Keynesian-style modest interventionist tradition, and so on
and so forth.44
None of the apparently ‘Marxist’ explanations offered by NIL authors, however,
even begin to point in that direction. Instead, what the readers are treated to, under
thebanner of themost ‘piercing’ ‘Marxist’ analysis of thenew imperial legal order, is,
at worst, the same brand of neo-Herderianism that made Huntington’s name in the
1990s, at best, a half-hearted spin-off of HansMorgenthau’s political realism theory,
complete with its quasi-theological animization of the ‘state’ and the concomitant
fetishization of inter-statal relations.45
42 One cannot rule out, of course, the possibility that, ultimately, this is just a result of some strategic choice. In
an intellectual environment traditionally dominated by theWestphalian statocentric paradigm, deploying
theMarxist analytic in earnest is not, after all, the most effective way to make one’s name.
43 Cf. H. Ticktin, ‘Political Economy and the End of Capitalism’, (2007) 35 (1) Critique 67.
44 For an excellent attempt to explore this problematic in a decidedly systematic fashion, albeit mainly from
an international relations perspective, see G. Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First
Century (2007). See also P. Anderson, ‘Jottings on the Conjuncture’, (2007) 48 New Left Review 5; S. Watkins,
‘Continental Tremors’, (2005) 33New Left Review 5.
45 See the essay by Panitch and Grindin (pp. 21–43).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
470 REVIEW ESSAYS
Arnold Wolfers, himself a prominent ﬁgure in the political-realist movement,
once remarked disparagingly that the idea of global politics adopted by the realist
tradition was essentially based on the imagery of a billiard ball:46 ‘opaque, hard,
clearly deﬁned spheres’ interacting with one another only ‘through collision’.47
That the best alternative the NIL ‘Marxists’ have found to the Herderian Volkgeist
tradition was precisely the same vision which the US ideologues of the Cold War
era used to justify their neocolonial aspirations should at the very least give one
considerable food for thought.
5. CONCLUSION
In one of his recent pieces Loı¨c Wacquant described the phenomenon of what
he called ‘false critical thought’ – a particular kind of socio-theoretical discourse
which, ‘under the cover of apparently progressive tropes’, serves deeply reactionary
political purposes by offering as its guiding theoretical frame a kind of spurious ‘soft
culturalismwholly absorbed by the narcissistic preoccupations of themoment’ and
thus, in effect, ‘invit[ing its audience] to submit to the prevailing forces of theworld,
and in particular to market forces’.48
At its worst, NIL scholarship represents a classic example of exactly this sort
of phenomenon. Denouncing the chilling advances of the new imperial order, it
mobilizes an ostensibly progressive tropology of ‘anti-hegemonism’ and the ‘rule
of law’, all the while projecting an understanding of neo-imperialism conceived in
essentiallymystiﬁcatory terms and a vision of law reiﬁed and fetishized beyond any
critical use. Attempting to throw light on the various historical events surrounding
theriseof thenewimperial legalorder, it chooses the2003 invasionof Iraqas itsmain
focal point, conveniently pushing aside awhole host of other farmore fundamental
developments, be it the breathtakingly fast juridiﬁcation of the WTO system or
the progressive evolution of the ‘augmented’Washington Consensus. Pretending to
equip its readerswithanewintellectual toolkit, it offers insteadaguiding theoretical
frame constructed from some of themost reactionary examples of culturalist essen-
tialism and ahistorical fetishism. Pretending to explain the squabble born out of
the inter-imperial resentment between the United States and ‘old Europe’, it dresses
it up as if it were the only meaningful form which the politics of anti-imperialist
resistance could take in the modern world.
Quite unsurprisingly, every bottom-line conclusion it ends up producing pushes
asitscentralmessagetheideaofthehistorical inevitabilityoftheneedtoacquiesce: in
the essential logic of the existing global capitalist system, in the general domination
bytheadvancedeconomiesof theNorthAtlanticregion, inthecorrespondingsystem
of global political conﬁgurations grosso modo, and even, ultimately, perhaps, in the
new global imperial order itself.
46 A.Wolfers,Discord and Collaboration (1962), 82.
47 A.-M. Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations’, (2000) 285 RCADI 9, 34.
48 Wacquant, supra note 2, at 99.
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‘Whenevaluatingtheoreticaldebates’,writesJohnHutnyk, ‘it isgoodtoremember
how the displacement of concepts is another, sometimes overlooked, mode in the
general disorientation of our times that sells us rightwards drift in the guise of a
committed politics.’49 In the end, one could not have put it better about NIL.
Still, if, as Jameson suggests, we always require a stronger interpretation to over-
throw and refute the one that is already in place,50 it seems it will not be enough to
simply lay the NIL scholarship bare for what it is – we also need to produce some
sort of an alternative to it. How that can best be done, however, is a story that is best
left for another occasion.
49 J. Hutnyk, BadMarxism (2004), 139.
50 Jameson, supra note 19, at xiii.
